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Gordian knot

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AHA, as Charlie Chan supposedly said when he examined a stab victim: "the clot thickens." The Inquirer editorial today takes strong exception to the attempt to transfer Rep. Satur Ocampo to Leyte and compares it to the style of the German Gestapo. Columnist Amando Doronila says official actions (the Ocampo "kidnapping," as he puts it) are belied by official rhetoric (the President's speech to the graduating class of the Philippine Military Academy). But for every expression of concern over the government's handling of persons and groups it considers threats, there are also equally strong manifestations of support. Their claims to the contrary notwithstanding, radicals have always been a minority in our society: but among radicals, believers in Mao Zedong Thought (see the entry under "Maoism" in the Encyclopedia of Marxism) compose the majority of radicals though even they are divided between those who want to pursue a "people's war," and those who've decided to pursue a peaceful political path (more or less). .John's last post suggests to me that while Mao Zedong himself viewed victory as inevitable, Filipino believers in Mao are stuck with the reality that victory hasn't been achieved for forty years -and isn't about to take place anytime soon. And thus, they (the followers of Mao, or those influenced by his thinking) have to find a reason why it is that most Filipinos haven't embraced Marxism when its believers think it provides the answer and the solution to everything. In a sense it's easier to blame outsiders for the lack of local support. So, as John said, blame America. This is something the Marxist may find comforting because it latches on to a widely-held assumption, anyway. Here's something that used to be said of our country in the 1960s. Who, the question went, were the three most important people in the Philippines? The answer went, 1. The US Ambassador 2. The head of the Lopez family3. The President of the Philippines. In that order. What John discussed has been the subject of academic interest. I particularly recommend "Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Modern America)" (Nick Cullather) for those interested in reading on the subject further. But I'm wary of getting bogged down in the finer points of dogma concerning Mao and whatever interpretations his local followers have adopted in turn. To be sure, we have to try to understand what all the fuss is about. But we should also pay attention to a larger question, if you will. The question is: how should a government defend itself and the people it claims to represent? Benito Mussolini was a Socialist before he became an exponent of Fascism (Socialism can be different from Communism, see the Internet Modern History Sourcebook for more), and he was a gifted journalist before he became a politician. Something he wrote (found in "In Defence of Politics" (Bernard Crick) I'm certain, will appeal, and make sense to, some readers:
Was there ever a government in history that was based exclusively on the consent of the people and renounced any and every use of force? A government so constituted there never was and never will be. Consent is as changeable as the formation of the sands on the seashore. We cannot have it always. Nor can it ever be total. No government has ever existed which made all its subjects happy. Whatever solutions you happen to give to any problem whatsoever, even though you share the divine wisdom, you would inevitably create a class of malcontents… How are you going to avoid that this discontent spread and constitute a danger for the solidarity of the state? You avoid it with force –by employing force inexorably where it is rendered necessary. Rob any government of force and leave it only with its immortal principles, and that government will be at the mercy of the first group that is organized and intent on overthrowing it.
A specific word Mussolini used -"inexorable"- to describe how force should be used, is at the heart of the objections expressed by Doronila and the Inquirer editorial. Force is such a dangerous thing to use, that the last thing that should be done is use it promiscuously. But such an attitude -that insists on nuances- can lead to impatience. Particularly since nuances take time, and they don't offer immediate gratification. A case in point is today's story of a general who offered government a share of his loot, if charges against him are dropped. One story like this illuminates just how complicated, time-consuming, and frustrating something like counterinsurgency is. Can a military with crooked generals, ever defeat insurgents? And which is the chicken and which is the egg: corrupt and abusive officers incompetently leading the AFP, or poverty that breeds insurgents, for which you need the AFP to crush it? Which should come first: cleaning up the military, or cleaning up the countryside of rebels? And the questions can go on and on, with infinite variation. Problems can get so tangled-up that they become a kind of Gordian knot, and like Alexander the Great, leaders are tempted simply to hack through the whole  knotty mess with a sword. Clean the AFP later. Fight poverty later. Just get rid of the NPA now -and anyone who might help them. Now.
Aha, as Charlie Chan supposedly said when he examined a stab victim: "the clot thickens."The editorial today John's last post reminded me of something that used to be said of our country in the 1960s.  Who, the question went, were the three most important people in the Philippines?...  The head of the Lopez family3.

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2 Comments

to john and mlq3 - congrats for current. what a wonderful boost for blogging as a communications tool! Godspeed.

Your question: "Can a military with crooked generals, ever defeat insurgents? "

The answer is NO!

Don't ask me why not, check history books. Difficult enough for a military with honest generals to defeat insurgents, why should a military with crooked generals do any better?

Military solution is not THE only solution to defeat insurgency; generals need an added option to defeat insurgency, i.e., "win hearts and minds,"; sadly this tenet is not exactly a welcome tenet in a military with crooked generals.

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This page contains a single entry by Manuel L. Quezon III published on March 21, 2007 3:59 PM.

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