But it seems to me questionable whether any government has the right to demand loyalty from its citizens beyond its willingness or ability to render actual protection. -Quezon To MacArthur, January 28, 1942
For once, I agree absolutely with Bong Montesa: never play the game of chicken. If this recent Inquirer editorial pointed out the administration has so botched up the peace process and is zigzagging so clumsily today, as to make the restoration of peace so much more difficult, the subsequent Inquirer editorial,suggests the MILF finds itself in a bind, because of the hostilities that have erupted and for which it took credit. Pointing to August 22 news item MILF Chair Al Haj Murad raise points in meeting IMT and the from Luawaran.com, the editorial suggested that the MILF (or the faction of its leadership that wanted to achieve its political aims through negotiations) was trying to invoke the assistance of its Malaysian sponsors. See -MILF asks Malaysia to convene peace panel - INQUIRER.net, Philippine News for Filipinos
Davao City councilor Peter Lavina in his bog, suggests that the Malaysian government officially speaking, is supportive. But the political reality in Malaysia is that the government is in its own version of survival mode. Lip service and a little diplomatic nudging here and there is all very good, but in determining the cost-effectiveness of using a nation’s resources (diplomacy, economics, military, etc.) there is little going for Malaysia if it publicly supports armed rebellion on the part of the MILF.
Militarily, even, the dilemma is there. If you assume, as some do, that the MILF possesses SAM’s in its inventory, it cannot use them now, or even later. For to do so would provide proof of foreign funding or at least facilitation/support; and regionally speaking, Malaysia as the likely culprit would trigger unease in Indonesia and alarm countries like Thailand (both being firm U.S. allies) which is fighting its own Muslim secessionists.
And so it seems the last-ditch appeal, perhaps by the more moderate among the MILF’s leadership, is for the Malaysians to give a sign that they continue to enjoy that country’s confidence and backing, in an effort to convince the other foreign powers to head off full-blown hostilities. Again, here is a confluence of interests: the Americans wouldn’t be too keen on hostilities because as the primary funder of our armed forces it would have to foot the bill and this includes what the Americans know all too well includes lining generals’ pockets (see Who Profits From The War in Mindanao? | Filipino Voices). It wouldn’t even really help the American arms industry. Not much money to be gained with out Korea and Vietnam War-era weaponry.Add to this the possibility that SouthEast Asia, including the Philippines, exists in a kind of policy limbo vis-a-vis Washington: In Asia » Blog Archive » Asian Policy Challenges for the Next President.
But that doesn’t mean that these nations could prevent a shooting war, either.
So when the MILF announced, on August 21, it would hold a press conference on August 23, I had deep misgivings. What would they say? After their former brio, they’d been complaining that AFP uses excessive force in attack pulverizing Muslim communities, which ignores who started the fighting or the absurdity of expecting the AFP not to send in the PAF.
Third, uncertainty concerning traditional allies such as the United States (see US silent on MILF terrorism « Peter Laviña New Blog) and Fourth, the possibility that the armed forces intervened by mounting operations even when the President hadn’t quite made up her mind on that to do. In his blog, thenutbox actually suggests the President announced offensive operations to retroactively rubberstamp the armed forces’ decision to begin them, regardless of the President’s position on the matter:
What my uncle told me was that Mrs. Arroyo actually ordered the attacks against MILF after the generals have already decided to launch the AFP offensive.
Arroyo’s inability to control her temper, his hypothesis went on, is actually borne out of her fright of the generals’ deciding by themselves without consulting her. She made a complete turn-around in his policy towards the MILF to appease the generals who were clearly pissed off with the BJE deal she made with the rebel group. And she wanted to appease the generals as soon as possible, hence her uncontrolled emotions for the delay of the taping.
At first I dismissed this as another conspiracy theory from a Gloria-hater. But veteran journalist Ellen Tordessillias, in a reply to a comment I posted on her blog, confirmed that, indeed, the anti-MILF mopping operations were actually carried out before the Bitch ordered them.
The President hasn’t given supporters of the peace deal any chance to save themselves or the cause of peace. Which, sad to say, has been the repeated experience of those who still suffer from the delusion that they can achieve their idealistic goals by means of a pragmatic alliance with the President.
And refer to GOING IN CIRCLES « THE MOUNT BALATUCAN MONITOR and PUSONG MAMON « THE MOUNT BALATUCAN MONITOR to get a glimpse into how people -particularly Filipinos seized by uncertainty in the affected areas of Mindanao- began to send the message to civilian and military officials alike that in the absence of any reassuring information that the governmet knew what it was doing and would defend citizens seized by panic, that they would then take matters into their own hands.
He also urged community leaders to lead the people under them, to prepare for the worst, and fight if the need arose. He also mentioned the presence of the tanks and the several thousand strong army defending Iligan.
He also mentioned that the people of Iligan should not be afraid because God and Senior San Miguel was on our side. He closed his speech with a, “Viva Senior San Miguel!,” to which the people heartily replied a “Viva”.
Although, I’m Protestant and do not agree with Catholic veneration of saints and even angels, I could not help but realize that the Mayor was speaking the heart language of the Iliganon, something that they could understand. He was speaking the old language of the Spanish times at the time when the citizens of the old fort of Iligan defended the fort and even waged battle against the Moros. Historically, even though Iligan was just a doorstep away from the Moro stronghold of Marawi, it was never conquered by Muslims despite the fact that at that time their pirates raided Christian towns as far away as Luzon.
“War,” Clausewitz famously wrote, “is the continuation of politics by other means.” Samuel Johnson also famously warned that “patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels,” and yet it is also a time when a formerly divided people can find unity and leaders can tap into a kind of mystical reservoir of national solidarity and idealism:
As Juned Sonido, perhaps one of the most even-tempered bloggers around reflected, in a time of conflict there is the need to be aware of the dangers of jingoism and the imperative that should weigh heavily on all those in authority: to provide protection from those who hold allegiance to the state. What distinguishes the two? A clear and present danger, a compelling need:
At present waltzing around the negotiation table is as useful as cupping a corpse. It is hard to negotiate when one side has not given up the armed option or has no control over its army while the other side seems to be following the likes Neville Chamberlain at Munich - practicing vermi-negotiation or the art and science of negotiations by the worms at Munich.
Meanwhile, the war continues and people are hurt. A few hours ago a bomb was exploded in Zamboanga. Will this again reach the other corners of the country. Another bomb in the MRT or LRT?
Is this jingoism? No. This is a matter of national self defense.
It is the duty of the State to protect the citizens who opt to stay in this country. Otherwise these same citizens will go to other means to protect themselves.
You have to wonder whether such viligantism can view anything other than bloodcurdling hostility as acceptable.
The reality however is that even though it’s always denied it, the Palace is sensitive to public opinion particularly when that opinion starts triggering May, 2001 flashbacks in the President’s inner circle.
Where that opinion is -and how it’s increasingly hostile to any policy other than crushing the MILF- can be gleaned from surveying the blogosphere:
12:52 PM Our principal called for an emergency meeting, the second meeting we had today that zeroed in on matters of safety and security. The schools has received calls that messages were circulating about schools in General Santos City whose students and teachers were hostaged. We were not very sure of the report but for the reason that we have to secure the safety of our students, we have decided to send them home.
However, we could not simply let them take the public transport, which will drop them in downtown GenSan. So, we arranged for vehicles that will take them to their respective homes. Those who have their own vehicles were fetched by their parents.
What happened in the elementary school is a different story. Panicking parents rushed to the school fetching their kids. Some drivers told us about the chaos in the elementary school.
Some member of the authorities went to our school to reassure us that none of the reported events were true and that we are relatively safer here. That’s a bit of a relief. But who knows what will happen next? Better safe than sorry.
Intuitive: We Need Your Prayers echoes the unreported reality for most Filipinos, worried about loved ones and even their property and livelihoods. Meanwhile, everyone waits to see which side will escalate matters and bring the front lines to other metropolitan centers of the Philippines.
Today’s Inquirer editorial proposes the abolition of special license plates for officials. This is an issue that appears and clutters the opinion pages and then wanes with predictable regularity. Officialdom, even when not corrupt or abusive, thrives on the symbols of privilege. Special license plates are the equivalent of the gold braid and other insignia that obsesses the military, for example (reading the story of virtually any revolutionary army and you’ll find, as happened to Washington and Aguinaldo, that even in societies aiming to establish a republican regime, titles and symbols of rank obsessed those holding and aspiring to them).
The plates that members of the House and the Senate use are often abused not by the members themselves, but their relatives. College campus parking lots often boast vehicles bearing Congressional plates used by the children or nieces and nephews of Representatives, for example. Neither the schools nor the student bodies do anything about it.
I have always opposed the abolition of official plates not only because I believe that protocol is not the real issue at hand and therefore, that those who oppose protocol only do so from ignorance and the wrong sort of egalitarian instincts but because they do serve a practical purpose.
For example, the editorial completely ignored the flipside to the reality it pointed out: the reality being that it may just be that policemen who spot vehicles bearing official plates will be intimidated into not enforcing traffic rules when it comes to that vehicle; the flipside is that what is probably more intimidating is neither the vehicle nor the plate but rather, the strong probability whoever’s riding in the vehicle is accompanied by bodyguards and a motorcyle escort composed of policemen more senior and agressive than any regular traffic enforcer.
The editorial also ignores the executive department. Aside from the President of the Philippines (No. 1) and the Vice-President of the Philippines (No. 2) in the past, cabinet members had their own official plates. But if you’ve noticed, even cabinet members entitled to cabinet plates have dispensed with using them. Does this mean that they rush around without the benefit of motorcycle escorts or bodyguards? Of course not.
What they do is rush around with escort vehicles and a retinue of motorcycle escorts with sirens, but without official plates, and, I’ve noticed quite often in recent years, usually without any license plates attached to their vehicle at all.
The end result of this is that no one can stop the little convoy trying to bully its way through traffic, but no one can figure out who the official is, although it’s obvious (because some of the escort vehicles sport license plates with red numbers, indicating they are government vehicles) that the person being escorted is an official. Proximity of the little convoys to and from the presidential palace indicates they’re off to or coming from the Palace.
Presidents periodically issue Executive Orders, Administrative Orders, Memorandum Circulars, etc., regulating the use of motorcycle escorts (if memory serves me right, the most recent one limits official escorts and sirens to the President, Vice-President, Senate President. Speaker of the House and Chief Justice, Nos. 1 to 5, respectively), an executive issuance the chief executive’s own subordinates take the lead in ignoring.
Members of Congress in a sense, are too stupid to realize they are living proof of why official plates make sense. As elected officials, they have to respond to the public and when the public is critical of their behavior, they have to modify it accordingly: and the public knows what it does precisely because the official plates identify the members of the legislature.
In contrast, officials in the executive department have it both ways: they violate the law, and do so with impunity, because they continue to enjoy anonymity.
It seems the Speaker of the House is too stupid to tell the LTO, which wants each official plate to identify the district the legislator belongs to, that it ought to look into the number of vehicles used by cabinet members and other presidential subordinates that don’t use license plates at all, and all of which violates executive issuances, and how diplomatic vehicles (the 1000 plates used by ambassadors which are supposed to identify the country of the ambassador) tape over their country designations.
But he is not being too politically-obtuse in not holding a caucus asking his colleagues to limit the plates they use (ideally, each legislator should only get one pair of plates for one vehicle, not multiple plates for multiple vehicles as happens these days) and agree to identifying their districts (if the objection is security then the legislator ought to not use official plates, and not use escorts, and take their chances going incognito in private cars). They’d never agree, and he knows it.
Keep the official plates. We’re entitled to know where our representatives are, and whether they drive around with a minimum of fuss or with an elaborate escort. As with so many things, the debate is over the wrong things -not official plates, but the abuse of them and that includes new innovations as demonstrated by the executive department.
The President’s fury at inept underlings made the evening news and was blogged extensively (one of the first to do so was Ang sa Wari Ko; while A Filipina Mom Blogger used it as a take off point for a discussion on stress management).
She’s naturally stern and “mataray” and I believe she’s been using this trait so that she’ll get things running and will make her officials more responsible and quick moving. Sabi nga nung sassy reporter di ba, being mataray isn’t really a bad thing.
But seeing her actions this noon.
The outburst?
The overflow of emotions?
I couldn’t help but compare it with past incidents.
Before, her taray ways surfaced for a reason, for an aim.
Today?
What happened, sadly, showed that she wasn’t able to control her emotions.
Sure, the outburst was borne out of frustration because of the inefficiency of her staff. (Pareho lang kapag pinapagalitan ang mga opisyales niya nuon di ba?)
BUT, it can’t be denied that this time, she looked like she was whining.
She knew that the media was there to see and cover the whole thing, but she continued with the histrionics. The drama escalated, it didn’t taper down.
She didn’t appear like she was in control.
I can even dare say that she appeared like she’s gone ROCK BOTTOM. (Just look at her resigned but angry look when she finally emerged to deliver her statement.)
And that is quite telling.
I agree with him. A president with a temper is nothing new, and it could even be argued that Filipino-style management seems to require a volcanic fury to get underlings to get things done. In itself, it is neither unpresidential or unseemly. She’s displayed her temper before. But what was different was that the President displayed a different kind of anger altogether.
One blogger, the cat is out, simply puts forward her grim personal experience in the past:
years back - as i kid i had witnessed and live through the horror of war in mindanao. i have been a refugee in my own country. not everyone is lucky enough to live through it . but there will always be the scar: physical and emotional that will keep on reminding me/us..of the pain we have suffered.
mindanao - the land of promise..or should i say broken promises..we are the bread basket of the phillipines, yet our people are hungry.. we are the only contiguous island the philippines has.. yet within, we are so divided in hearts and minds..year after year of conlficts have only produced military generals but not concrete resolutions to peace and development. not even a signed moa can end this violence i tell you..
i did not know how the war started back then…i do not know how it will end.
Today’s Inquirer editorial looks at the recent conduct of MILF troops and raises a question: if the violence in Mindanao was perpetrated by rogue or lost commands of the MILF, how, then, can it be deemed capable of administering the proposed BJE?
The editorial also points to this press statement by the MILF, while over at The PCIJ blog, Soliman Santos suggests the further radicalization of Moros if hostilities continue. He points to this commentary (“Reality Check” by Ibrahim Canana) that appeared on the MILF website (incidentally also validating my opinion concerning the importance of signing the agreement in the presence of representatives of foreign powers, including the OIC representative): it is a concise and lucid articulation of the Moro interpretation of their history and of the MILF position vis a vis the Philippine state. And it is uncompromising in its conclusion:
The political opposition to the MOA-AD that spurred the nationwide reaction against the MILF and the Bangsamoro people has dangerously transformed a peace process that is supposed to bring reconciliation to two peoples at war with each other into a grim scenario that allows no space for the Moros to have a breathing spell.
Through the MNLF, the Moros asked for a meaningful political autonomy in 1976. Instead they were granted a fake one by the GRP under the Marcos regime using the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which allowed constitutional processes to shortchange the Moros. In 1996, the Moros again under the MNLF demanded for meaningful political autonomy; and again what they were given in the so-called MNLF-GRP Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was the ARMM, which was created before the FPA and whose autonomy was clipped by the Philippine constitution. Inevitably, the ARMM ended up reduced to merely being an extension of the Office of the Philippine President. Later, it was even taken out of MNLF hands and became a political prize awarded to the Moro warlord most loyal and subservient to the sitting regime.
Now, under the MILF, the Moros want to recover whatever little is left of their ancestral domain and be given the chance to govern themselves as a sub-state entity within the larger Philippine nation-state. Peace on the basis of justice is about to be achieved under this formula. But even this does not sit well with the Filipino elite, the politicians, the Church and the Filipino colons in Mindanao. They have sabotaged the efforts of their own government. All, including those who claimed to be sympathetic to the plight of the Bangsamoro people like Senator Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel, Jr., have ganged up against the Bangsamoro people to prevent them from even reclaiming areas which they now actually occupy and where they are the majority. The result: back to square one. Mindanao again is on the edge of an all-out war.
The selfishness of the Filipino ruling elite in general and the Filipino politicians in particular is dumbfounding. Their lack of sense of justice is appalling. They and their drumbeaters in the Philippine media can lie through their teeth and still have a nice sleep at night. Imagine telling the public the fantastic spin that Malaysia is arming the MILF and the Americans are behind the Moros’ desire to be an “independent Islamic State”. Why, they can’t even make sense of their allegations and lies! You can never find any mention of an “independent Islamic state” in the MOA-AD even if the pages were turned upside down. To even say that the Americans are behind the attempt by the MILF to create a “Bangsamoro Islamic State” is absurd. What fantasy! What ignorance! Hollywood hogwash has taken grip of the Filipino mind that it no longer knows what is real and what is imaginary. No wonder why the Philippine nation-state is moribund.
No wonder why tens of thousands of Filipinos are leaving this country for good. Now I can better appreciate the context of what Ustadz Salamat Hashim, the late MILF Amir, said when he stated that we should not believe the Filipino unbelievers even when they say that the crow is black!
What needs to be stated here for the record is that we Moros are not inclined to abandon our homeland to these vultures. We will fight for it as our ancestors fought for it. The mestizo leftovers of the Spaniards such as the likes of Teddy Locsin and Lobregat, and Filipino colons in Mindanao like Piñol as well as their capitalist patrons ensconced in Makati can go hang themselves from nearest lamp post for all we care. The Moros will fight. MILF Base Commander Ustadz Amirul Ombra Cato will not be alone. A war in Mindanao will drag down this pathetic, artificial country and its government to perdition. Perhaps this time we will no longer settle for a sub-state or a federative arrangement with the Filipinos. It’s useless anyway because they would never grant it. They would always insist this is ‘secession’ even if we do not have the intention to secede. So let’s give them a dose of their own medicine. Let’s aim for independence this time. For real. Like what the Algerians did when their clamor for autonomous rule was repeatedly and violently denied by the French colons. Given the Filipinos’ hostile attitude to anything Moro and Muslim, there is no other option left. This is now the reality facing us.
The mention of Algeria is signficant. It had been considered an integral part of France; de Gaulle, faced with a nationalist uprising, decided to abandon the French settlers and recognize Algeria’s independence; at one point, the French armed forces tried to mount a coup against de Gaulle. Yet independence hasn’t prevented the rise of Islamic extremism in Algeria. The problem is Arroyo is no de Gaulle.
The frustration of the writer quoted above with suggestions the Americans are in league with the MILF (or that the MILF is being armed by the Malaysians, when obviously political and even financial support is plenty of help and there are many AFP members willing to sell arms to the MILF anyway) isn’t about to change the mind of say, Tony Abaya (who says it boils down to the MILF being, in American eyes, more dependable than Christian leaders) or blogger Philippine Politics 04.
And the thing is, if one presents a narrative, even a counter-narrative, it will never end (if Moros can assert they achieved a “higher plane” of political existence with the sultanates, then by any measure a republic trumps any hereditary principality in terms of political evolution) and be trumped, always by what wars always end up being about: real estate.
In his column today, Manuel Buencamino points to the problem on focusing too much on the past as a justification for the present:
Why did the Arroyo administration agree to the MILF’s self-serving historical timeline?
Islam is no more indigenous than Christianity. The Spaniards were not our first colonizers. Luwaran, the MILF web site, does not deny that Moros are products of an earlier colonization:
“Ameen [secretary general of the MILF Central Committee] recalled that the history of the Moros and IPs [indigenous peoples] is one and inseparable, but noted that the former were always the ‘bigger brother’ while the latter [was] the ‘younger brother.’” Moros “have developed a higher plane of political existence” than lumads because they converted to Islam and adopted the sultanate system.
In that same Sona, Gloria Arroyo lamented that although Mindanao was a food basket, “it has some of the highest hunger in our nation.” For this sad state of affairs, she blamed “the endless Mindanao conflict.” Her solution to ending the endless conflict was to capitulate to the MILF.
Arroyo knows the BJE does not fit into the 1987 Constitution, so she asked Congress “to act on the legislative and political reforms that will lead to a just and lasting peace during our term of office.”
Unfortunately, a “just and lasting peace” through a refitting of the BJE into our Constitution won’t be possible during or after her term of office.
There will be conflicts between the lumads and the MILF, between Christians and the MILF, between Manila and the MILF over jurisdiction, ownership of lands, mineral rights, natural resources and a host of other irritants that come from drawing lines on a map without regard for its inhabitants.
There will be power struggles among self-appointed Moro leaders—the Maranao-dominated MILF, the Tausog-dominated MNLF and the traditional politicians of Mindanao—over control of the BJE.
“Better talk than fight, if nothing of sovereign value is anyway lost,” counseled Gloria Arroyo in her Sona.
Unfortunately, talking nonsense will lead to loss not only of sovereign value but also, and more important, of property. And for that, most people will fight to the death.
For the Christian (Ilonggo) side, HabagatCentral Republic offers up a personal reflection buttressing Buencamino’s insight:
There were cases of outright land grabbing from the ancestral domains of the Moros and Lumads who were then ignorant about the Western concept of “private property” as the lands were considered “communal” and for all people to share. Land grabbing that lead to land conflicts. Land conflicts that lead to bloodshed, my grandfather himself was a victim of this trechery.
I have relatives in Mindanao who have hated the Moros. They are backward, backstabbers and barbarian. Di daw dapat sila pagkakatiwalaan. Di ko rin sila masisisi. They’ve seen their love ones slaughtered by the Moro raids of the towns especially during the 1970’s. The very foundation of Ilaga, a vigilante group composed of mostly Kristyanos and some Lumads, was borne out of reaction against the Moros. They sow terrorism in the hearts of the Moros as they kill them with reported cannibal activities. As a reaction, the Moros established their own vigilante group known as the Blackshirts/Barracudas. So the question, is terrorism a Moro problem?
MNLF/MILF & AFP has instigated a somewhat revolutionary violence. The former is for the seperation of the Mindanao that they claim is rightfully theirs, and I understand them. They weren’t subjugated by the Spaniards and was never converted to Christianity as what they define as “Filipino.” They are fiercely independent and will fight for what is right. The latter on the other hand defends the Philippines and its sovereignity. Their causes are noble yet the effects to ordinary civilians were catastrophic. Casualties have reached over a hundred thousand for years of war with each other in Mindanao. No matter how noble their causes are, it is still somewhat politically-culturaly motivated. In the end, the civilians still suffer.
In my opinion, I would still uphold MILF as a revolutionary movement still. Abu Sayyaff on the other hand is just pure banditry using Islam as an excuse to their savagery. The latter in my belief is the salot. The former on the other hand has still a handful of options to sit and talk what is necessary. For the betterment of their own peoples.
Ewan ko lang pero parang hindi ko maiwasan na ibuntong ang sisi sa Pamahalaang Arroyo sa mga pangyayaring ito ngayon na muling gumigimbala sa kapayapaan ng Mindanao at Pilipinas. I went there several years ago and I was seeing optimism that finally, Mindanao can move on towards peace and progress. That the government is seating alongside with the rebels. But because of the sudden declaration of the signing of the Memo of Agreement for the Bangsamoro Judirical Entity, Mindanao was thrown into state of panic, may it be the Kristyanos, the Moros and even the Lumads.
I’ve restrained myself from looking into other blogs of the Kristyanos and even of the Moros…Its really frustrating. Parang sumulpot muli ang inate hatred towards each other. I got frustrated with this notion but I couldn’t blame them why. I understand them. But is violence or war really the solution to ever-lasting peace in this island or in this country? Care to look at Palestine perhaps? You may have crushed the rebels but you haven’t ceased yet the root of struggle. Hanggang dahon at sanga lang…pero yung ugat di pa napapatay. Purging Moro ideals to the point of genocide is of murder, that is outright savagery! So what do we do then? How can we help to stop the vicious cycle.
I was thinking then that this animosity of ours will be brought towards the end of human civilization.
Ano kaya ang tamang solusyon sa Mindanao/Bangsamoro Problem? Ridu rin ba kaya o ubusan ng lahi?
As far as making sense of events, As blogger smoke asks what many are asking: was the President even thinking?
The thing is this - the President’s men (and therefore the President herself) dangled the idea of the BJE in front of the bandits and sold themselves on the idea that it would work. This played them right into the bandit’s hands: by putting all their eggs in the BJE basket, the President’s men gave the bandits the opportunity to set up an ultimatum - give us the BJE or we start shooting again.
When the BJE was scuttled the bandits got their casus belli. Now admittedly its a flimsy rationale for the resumption of hostilities, but it is just solid enough to rile up the cannon-fodder and convince them that they’ve been shafted and therefore need to avenge their slighted pride. It’s Moro psychology 101, if anyone had bothered to check.
And that’s the point: the Commander-in-Chief is supposed to be able to take in the whole picture; to understand how various factors all contribute to the outcome. In this case, because the President’s men were allowed - perhaps even encouraged - to formulate a do-or-die solution, it is clear that there were critical factors that were ignored, not the least of which is the very well known tendency of Moros to exaggerate insults to their pride.
In hostage negotiation, one of the most basic lessons is to never say no to the hostage taker. But then again, this also covers situations where saying ‘yes’ sets you up to say ‘no’ later. Let me clarify: by saying yes to the idea of a BJE, the President’s men were committing to an outcome that was not in their control. It was stupid for them to imagine that the BJE would slip through unnoticed. More to the point, the President’s men simply failed to anticipate a negative outcome, i.e., the BJE would be challenged and stopped. So, by saying yes, to the BJE, they were blindly rushing into a future where - when the Supreme Court invalidates the MOA for instance - they would have no choice but to say no to the BJE. And there you go, they said NO to the hostage taker.
This turn of events led the hostage taker - the bandits - to now feel backed into a corner. The only way out of that corner would have been a MOA for the BJE. But with no MOA forthcoming, and the additional insult of the ARMM elections being conducted, the bandits embraced the belief that there would be no other solution than to come out with their guns blazing. No solutions. War.
But using Occam’s razon, blogger Tongue In, Anew returns to the blogosphere and puts forward this thought-provoking analysis of the situation: it was all, and remains, simple, really. According to the blogger (who, while anonymous, has had very interesting entries in the past, suggesting an individual who is plugged-in), it’s all a charade:
Assperon’s appointment to the Peace portfolio was suspect way back… Not to mention the Ass was then joiningGen. Boogie Mendoza, a former Razon protege, and an “acclaimed anti-terrorist expert”…
On the other side of the fence, a separatist front of freedom fighters on Mondays, Abu Sayyaf kidnappers on Tuesdays, Jemaah Islamiya trainees on Wednesdays, lost command on Thursdays, devout Muslims on Fridays, and plain farmers and merchants on weekends. Overseen by their provisions suppliers from Malaysia.
Now what do we have? A highly volatile cocktail made up of an administration struggling for perpetual survival, high-profile GWOT freaks looking for an opportunity to expand their military control and a wayward army of bandits all of them intelligent enough to know that peace was doomed in the first place but insist that they might just be able to pull it through.
No, Gloria didn’t plan to dismember the country via the MOA-AD, she knows it’s unconstitutional, luckily, the legit opposition saw through her, she even had to use her allies to petition for a TRO which her SC appointees readily obliged to. She was expecting widespread retaliation but the MILF hierarchy surprisingly held back, her emergency rule cannot be imposed! No martial law, no chacha either. Doom! The Ass’ loyal generals immediately had to scramble for the “Lost Commanders” Kato and Bravo who have been burning villages left and right in the past yet no sincere effort to bring them to justice was ever taken (You now have an idea why Kabalu insists these commanders were not ordered by MILF to do so). They needed them to jump start this stage of the war to put Plan B into action. Funny but Eid Kabalu hasn’t announced an all-out offensive yet. Nor has Puno and Teodoro. Who wants to really finish the war after all? Even Misuari’s MNLF are now wearing their old uniforms to defend their own territory. Against whom? The gov’t? MILF? Or the Lost Command?
Gloria’s “Defend every inch of the territory” spiel was predictably looking for just the right moment to be announced so she blew her top after finding out her staff had not even prepared the teleprompter.
This view puts forward the possibility that the administration wanted to maneuver the country into a situation permitting a state of emergency, while others in the military hierarchy quite possibly, refrained from cooperating fully, and the MILF command declined to do the government any favors. Offering a reward, accompanied by statements that only individuals, and not the entire MILF movement, will be deemed outlaws, provides an opening for tensions to subside. And all the while, the jitters continue. Blogging from Iligan City, preMEDitated recounted, yesterday:
Panic struck the city center earlier this night. People flocked to the City Hall for protection by military forces stationed there. Text messages soon followed warning of imminent MILF attacks.
Much of the rest of the populace is now in anticipatory mood.
General Luna of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has issued his statement for the populace to remain calm and to trust in them. He has also appealed to the citizens not to forward these messages as they only bring more harm than good.
PS I just heard this piece of news. It seems that this incident was sparked by a drunk who shouted,”M-I*.”
*A word used around here for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) terrorists.
Early tonight many people got panic because of that rumors that there were sightings of MILF in Iligan City. My family and neighbors freak out because they said that MILF are already in the near barangay Abuno and a lot of jeepneys from the City went back when they reached Tubod Bridge, going to south because they said that MILF is on the way. Many people were on the city streets because they wanted to evacuate. And this is confirm as a false alarm by our city mayor Lawrence Lluch Cruz, that is was just the soldiers that was seen and they thought that they are MILF. He said that there are many soldiers around the city that some mistaken them as MILF already maybe its because of the happenings in Lanao del Norte. He just stated on a news break at ABS - CBN that Iligan City is still safe from MILF and asking those who left their homes to go back already. I hope all this conflict will stop soon.
M.I.L.F or Moro Islamic Liberation Front is on war against Arm Forces of Philippines..As a girl who lives Mindanao (a place where there are many Muslim, but I am not one of them) it’s usual to hear news that Mindanao was that, was this, but you know August 2008 War was the only war that makes my province Zamboanga del Norte and my City, Dipolog to be afraid… Afraid because the whole Mindanao was really involve, the MILF want all the regions in Mindanao to be included in MOA or ARMM (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) to expand their teritory… Everybody was really panicking.. Even in my city, we receive Bomb Treats and War Rumors, and what did we did..? We packed up our things then really really get ready for what would happen. Last night we sleep at 1 a.m. because of it..
Returning to Tongue in Anew’s suggestion that the Palace was operating on simple assumptions -that it’s hands would be tied by predictable behavior on the part of the opposition and the MILF, which didn’t pan out as the former was caught napping and the latter more subtle and cunning than expected.
So it strikes me as possible there was a clumsy effort to promote war jitters to try to get the country to rally around the President: because it explains why the Palace proved so tolerant of the demagoguery of Pinol, etc. who, considering the administration’s intolerance for dissent, could easily have been slapped down, taken aside, or simply bribed to pipe down at a delicate time when the administration was claiming to be seriously behind the RP-MILF agreement.
What complicates the situation is that the public, unaware of the plots-within-plots on both sides, or the factions that exist within the ranks of the leadership of both sides, or that the leaders either do not believe their own propaganda, or worse, believe it- has its passions inflamed by the increasingly martial rhetoric of leaders who know the game of posturing quite well and who can therefore discount it.
And it may be that this time, the MILF leadership, beholden to Malaysia, etc., is being more responsible and trying to defuse the situation while saber-rattling, than the government: we forget that the MILF command had a choice to fully endorse the attacks but it did not, equivocating its official response might have been (but even equivocation is understandable in terms of the factional dynamics of any revolutionary organization). And other groups are trying to restore the momentum to reestablish at least the semblance of a brittle peace.
At the heart of these efforts are three simple ideas:
1. That if one side will insist that it is negotiating sincerely for peace, there must be a corresponding assumption the other side is also negotiating sincerely. That furthermore, national interests aside, it is in the regional interest of foreign countries to help foster peace in Mindanao.
2. That all lose when fighting resumes and all sides gain so long as discussions are ongoing, which provides a venue for differences to be threshed out, compromises arrived at, and a consensus reached.
3. That both sides have extremists who not only do not represent the majority view, but who have also figured out how their constituencies can be agitated by withholding information and an overall lack of confidence in the authorities.
The government is trying to make it appear as it was the Moro rebels fault that they hit the first strike but if you hear other sources especially the locals they were just protecting their properties. Who was taking what from whom? Or someone is maneuvering into something to make it appear as a religious war diverting the people’s attention?
Mon Casiple warned of the administration “playing the emergency card”:
The scenario is one where a justification for a state of emergency happens. Violent incidents increasingly happen and spread. The AFP is increasingly forced to defend towns and villages. The MILF, in turn, increasingly turn to its own offensives in order to defend Moro communities. In no time at all, we are into a deepened conflict until the military is convinced to agree to a declaration of a state of emergency.
For a national state of emergency to happen, there has to be demonstrated to exist a credible threat to the national seat of power in the National Capital Region, a nationwide state of war or terror, or attacks on national political leaders. The level of the resurgent conflict in Mindanao–even if it spreads to other areas in Mindanao–cannot yet justify this drastic option.
However, the next days or weeks bear watching because of the political scenario of charter change that requires neutralizing the opposition and terrorizing the people. With the recent show of widespread opposition to Malacañang’s charter change plans, only the emergency card is left to play.
Let us hope that desperate people do not cross the line of sanity.
Beyond hoping, this is a time to add your voice, not in endorsement of one particular proposal or another, but to voices opposed to conflict. Charo Logarta, a military wife, puts it this way:
Whatever it is, there’s gotta be a better option to this. The majority must be allowed peace and harmony. We have to end decades of strife and conflict. We, the majority, deserve better. Military wives and kids do not have to endure loss. Soldiers don’t have to die for causes that don’t even matter to many average Filipinos who simply want a better life.
Just think how optimistic most people were in Mindanao a year ago. And how, now, plans involving Mindanao are all on hold. See Stacy Nelson.
O, pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
That I am meek and gentle with these butchers!
Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
That ever lived in the tide of times.
Woe to the hand that shed this costly blood!
Over thy wounds now do I prophesy,-
Which, like dumb mouths, do ope their ruby lips,
To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue-
A curse shall light upon the limbs of men;
Domestic fury and fierce civil strife
Shall cumber all the parts of Italy;
Blood and destruction shall be so in use
And dreadful objects so familiar
That mothers shall but smile when they behold
Their infants quarter’d with the hands of war;
All pity choked with custom of fell deeds:
And Caesar’s spirit, ranging for revenge,
With Ate by his side come hot from hell,
Shall in these confines with a monarch’s voice
Cry ‘Havoc,’ and let slip the dogs of war;
That this foul deed shall smell above the earth
With carrion men, groaning for burial. -Shakespeare, Julius Caesar
In my view, the fatal flaw in the whole process of creating the MOA - even going beyond the constitutional issues and whether or not it was negotiated by the government in bad faith – is that the MOA was crafted in the shadows beyond the pale of public discussion and debate.
Which reflects the consensus, I suppose, on where the administration went wrong; but I am not convinced a hundred years of consultations or any administration expending political capital would get either side to budge. There are times when things just sort of fall into a kind of balance, uneasy at first, but which gradually becomes second nature and hence, while unofficial, semipermanent. This is the problem now; this where things had been for some years now, accounting, in large part, for both the sense of optimism until last year, in Christian Mindanao, and the gradual appearance of Moros in other parts of the country, where they began to engage in trade and even start setting down roots.
On The Explainer last Tuesday (which you can watch online on YouTube) I presented a series of maps based, in turn, on maps you’ve already seen on previous entries, to argue along the lines of there being a basis for the territorial claims of the Moros. At the same time, looking at the past basis for today’s territorial claims also runs smack into the reality on the ground.
Starting with the present ARMM:
Then showing the areas proposed for inclusion by plebiscite next year:
Lost in this love-hate relationship, we have somehow forgotten that beyond the issue, beyond the discussions, beyond the “technicalities” — there are real people, real people that are truly affected. People whose lives hang by a thread, earnestly and patiently waiting for attention and assistance. While this issue is discussed in closed doors, in fancy halls and air-conditioned rooms, there are people who have become nomads in their own land, walking the ground in fear but braving it just the same — all because they have no choice, they are stuck there. They are waiting. Some hoping for salvation. Some have abandoned all hopes for such. Some indifferent as a result of witnessing too long a war — numb to anything that is and will probably happen. Some say this BJE is a mere guilt-trip by the government, due largely to the fact that Mindanao has been neglected for a long time — regardless if it were intended or not. Well, I say so what if it is? Isn’t it about time we cared? Imperial Manila, we have a problem! Right now, that is not even relevant. Guilt-trip or not, the fact remains that help is needed and fast. Let me ask you, when does guilt happen? When is it felt? Have you ever felt guilty about doing anything righteous? Have you ever felt guilty about helping a friend? I don’t think so. Guilt springs from the acknowledgement of a wrong-doing — whether intended or not. So, if there’s guilt, then by God, let us do some guilt-tripping! If you call giving people what’s rightfully theirs “guilt-tripping”, then call it that. If you call making peace guilt-tripping, then call it that for all I care. Those are just “terms”. “Terms” tend to be relative, ambiguous and easily misinterpreted. So let it pass. Let’s get past the concept of “terms” and work on something more universally understood — peace.
2. …I had a very interesting talk with a former official who has an intimate knowledge of both the peace process and the Department of National Defense. Here are some observations made by the official:
a. Conflict in Mindanao is “self-containing,” a curious term which I understand works along these lines: the military undertakes an offensive; the leadership of whatever Muslim group the military is targeting melts away, seeking safe havens in Palawan and Sabah; Muslim families in the affected areas immediately send their families to evacuation centers; the evacuation centers are overwhelmed; the UN begins to speak of a “humanitarian crisis”; foreign media arrives, to cover the humanitarian crisis; foreign and public scrutiny become so intense, military offensives must cease; peace, for the time being, is restored. It is a tired, old, predictable, and tragic, script but one that serves to prevent violence from spiraling out of hand.
I don’t see how the dynamics have changed, particularly since the military does not seem to have the element of surprise. In areas targeted for a military offensive, the MILF can melt away, while its troops engages its rivals in other areas, for example, in polling precints to disrupt the ARMM elections.
On August 9, the Inquirer editorial said the Supreme Court was in the delicate position of having to rule on the RP-MILF agreement without alienating public faith and confidence in it. Lawyers Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ (see The controversial GRP-MILF MOA) and Soliman Santos (see Will jurisprudence finally give peace a chance? in the PCIJ blog). seem inclined to argue that the Supreme Court actually has nothing to rule on, at present; that the Executive must sign the agreement, and then Congress should enact the laws and other things necessary to fulfill the agreement, before anyone can cry foul. At present, there is only the potential for mischief and both lawyers argue that the Court cannot rule on the basis of possibile scenarios. From overseas, blogger Left Flank seems inclined to support signing the agreement.
These will likely be unpopular opinions. Village Idiot Savant calls the agreement “the big sellout.” This seems to echo what people from the are are saying.
At the heart of opposition to the deal is the suspicion that there are deals within the deal, and they will result in a Muslim-dominated independent Mindanao. Increasingly, there’s been a lot of conspiracy-theorizing about the international dimension of the agreement, something that The Warrior Lawyer dryly recounts and which Amando Doronila takes up, in the broader context of international and domestic interests, too, today in a commentary.
Since the agreement, to put it bluntly, has the blessings of major powers, from the United States, to Australia, and including Japan (see Moro Views on Bangsamoro Affairs: the JICA has directly engaged the MILF and Moro NGO’s), not to mention Malaysia, everyone assumes that’s what’s in it for them won’t leave anything for anybody else.
This blog entry in bicycle diaries, who went to Muslim Mindanao on a US government grant, recounts local perspectives on the American presence in the area:
US foreign policy has given considerable military and diplomatic support to the Philippine government in its counter-insurgency war against two local Islamist groups: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF, and Abu Sayyaf, one of al-Qaeda’s most aggressive affiliates in southeast Asia. The relationship between these two organizations is murky and controversial. Nonetheless, most Mindanoans with whom I spoke agreed that they are both outgrowths of the more secular Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, which first appeared in the early 1970s to fight for Mindanao independence from the Philippines. Today, it is one of the few Islamic national liberation movements to have successfully laid down its arms to peacefully govern the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM, with grudging support from the Philippine government.
What is not murky is the US military and diplomatic presence in the south and west of the island where the Philippine army is fighting both the MILF and Abu Sayyaf. And like US counter-insurgency polices a hundred years before, US support is again perceived locally as a paradox. US Special Forces units have operated in MILF territory since the summer of 2002. While training the Philippine army has been their official mission, there seems to be little doubt locally that they are conducting the military operations themselves. In Marawi City, known as the only Muslim City in Mindanao, I met with one of the founders of the MNLF, the unofficial minister for propaganda for the ARMM. He not only reiterated this position, but also forcefully added that the CIA was responsible for both creating and arming the MILF and Abu Sayyaf to defeat the MNLF.
These and other conspiracy theories abound throughout the island despite the generally successful efforts of US public diplomacy. In addition to the roads and clinics built by US Special Forces and USAID, the State Department has reached out to local and regional peace groups working to sustain Zones of Peace where the Philippine army and the MILF have negotiated cease-fire agreements.
the question of course is whether American aid and assistance is concerned solely with neutralizing Islamic Fundamentalist groups like the JI or whether the Americans believe their interests are best served by having a Muslim client state in Mindanao.
An argument gaining currency is that the Americans believe they’d be better off negotiating with less than 10 million Moros than a Philippine government with a constituency of 90 million and which has been notoriously unreliable to boot. Aside from security, there would economic benefits for the United States (and Australia, and Japan, and Malaysia) from access to natural resources the Americans presumably mapped out as far back as a century ago (see this pre-1935 map):
I’ve said before that I think all sides are capable of posturing and that what may be noisy may not necessarily go beyond a previously agreed-upon, face-saving verbal aggression among the participants. But people have a tendency to be carried away and when politicians discover a gift for rabble-rousing, things can then get out of hand. Christian politicians thundering about mobilizing citizen militias, AFP officers sending ultimatums, MILF officials saying one thing but doing another: all may be winking at each other behind the scenes but their constituents don’t know this, and all you need is one small confrontation to erupt for the whole thing to rapidly degenerate into open fighting.
With our government handicapped by several realities, most of them harsh, such as the government knowing its forces are ill-equipped, poorly led, and with weakened morale; and that they are dependent on supplies from the Americans who may have other priorities than supplying an AFP hell bent on liquidating the MILF (one reason: the MILF has a tacit alliance with the Americans against the JI).
On the other hand both Christian and non-MILF Muslim leaders know that if the MILF carries this off, then it will be poised to prove to all comers that it can take them on, and that the regional powers will back it at the expense of the Philippine government.
I have written about the documentary Partition: The Day India Burned, in Inquirer Current but here it is, again, for you to view and because it places in context the points I want to raise at this point.
In the case of British India, the leaders of the Hindu majority proved incapable of reaching an agreement with the Muslim minority because while the Muslims proposed a state with weak national powers, the Hindus were set on establishing a state with strong central powers. The British proved too weakened by war to arbitrate or impose their will. They even had to abandon the Princely States, the various principalities that had directly established relations with the British Crown. I will return to some points concerning the Indian experience but for now, you may want to familiarize yourself with two Wikipedia articles, as good a start as any: Partition of India and Political integration of India (additional question: could Operation Polo have served as a model for the planned invasion of Sabah in the 1960s?). The failure of Nehru and Jinnah to resolve their differences is a cautionary tale; and I’ve long argued we have much to learn from the Indian experience.
It keeps disappearing from the web, so once again, here is my article “Repulsion and Colonization,” from 1996. In it, I pointed out Cabili’s objection to the Convention having a special provision concerning Muslim areas in which their representation would be determined by law.
If you recall the arguments made by some Muslim warlords concerning the 2007 elections, they insisted that their culture stresses obedience to those in authority, and so they essentially practice bloc voting. It’s interesting that in the Sultan Sa Ramain’s speech that I reproduced in my previous entry, he responded to delegate Jose Cabili as follows:
Last week, my co-Delegate, Mr. Cabili, spoke about the extension of suffrage to Mindanao and Sulu. With respect to that, I think the Delegates representing Mindanao and Sulu should be asked as to whether complete suffrage should be extended to the people of Mindanao and Sulu.
In view of the Sultan Sa Ramain’s reply to Cabili, and Cabili’s subsequent refusal to sign the Constitution it seems to me that the delegates did this as a concession to Muslim leaders, which infuriated the Christian (and possibly, more democratically-oriented) Cabili.
In Re-constructing Colonial Philippines: 1900-1910, historian Patricio Abinales (who is from Mindanao) made short shrift of the belief that Moro resistance to the Americans was both widespread and protracted:
Surprisingly, the pacification process was fast and relatively easy. There was hardly any resistance from the various indigenous communities in the Cordilleras, while Muslim resistance was scattered and unsustained. At the middle of the first decade, the Cordilleras and “Moro Mindanao” had become very stable and peaceful areas.
A major reason for the American success was the cooperation extended by Muslim and Cordilleran leaders to the Americans. They regarded colonial rule as a means of protecting themselves against Christians and “lowlanders.” American military officials reciprocated this cooperation by resisting the efforts of Filipinos to extend their power to the “special provinces.” A working relationship eventually developed between these community leaders and the Americans whereby the former were given minor posts in the provincial government (“tribal wards” in the case of the Muslims) in exchange for agreeing to recognize American sovereignty. U.S. army officers who administered these areas also became their protectors against Filipino leaders, doing everything they can to limit the presence of Manila and the Nacionalista party in the Cordilleras and “Moro Mindanao.”
The only major resistance came from the Muslims at the hills of Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak, when the army declared a ban on weapons and raised head taxes. American military superiority prevailed and over a hundred Muslim men, women and children were killed. Politically, however, these actions eroded the army’s standing and opened up an opportunity for Quezon to attack military rule in Mindanao. After the massacres, the army was forced slowly to concede authority to Manila and the Filipinos. The army’s powers were also clipped once the U.S. Congress authorized its partial demobilization, and once the American president ordered its withdrawal from the special provinces and its replacement by Philippine Constabulary units. Many American officers also preferred to continue their military careers in the U.S. mainland, seeing very little prospects in just limiting themselves to the Philippines. All these problems emboldened the Filipinos to assert their political presence in these special provinces. This was something that a weakened military government could not repulse anymore. In 1913, the army conceded its power to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, a body controlled from Manila and by Filipinos. The Cordilleras’ status as a special province was also terminated and the Nacionalista Party began recruiting its first “Cordillerans” to join the organization.
Two major features therefore characterized the first decade of colonial rule. First was the full and effective unification of Las Islas Filipinas under American rule, and second was the division of colony into two major zones of administration reflecting the histories of their respective populations. These two zones were eventually unified under the Filipinization policy, but the distinctiveness upon which they were based continued to affect overall colonial development. Muslims and Cordillerans remained staunchly pro-American and anti-Filipino, while Christian “lowlanders” continued to mistrust and maintain a low regard for these “wild tribes.”
The new datus of the colonial period were able to enhance their traditional status because of the power and wealth rhey had obtained through collaboration with American colonial authorities. With the early abandonment of the policy of indirect rule, their political positions were not predicated on any official American recognition of their traditional right to rule Cotabato Muslims. Instead, they were bestowed with ceremonial offices -as municipal district president, assemblyman, or (occasionally) senator- as tokens of their political ability to mediate between ordinary Maguindanaons and an alien colonial authority, and as rewards for their political willingness to ensure Muslim compliance with colonial aims. In return for these services they received, besides the trappings and privileges of office, the opportunity to exploit new potential sources of wealth. Thery also retained control over the agrarian sector during the colonial period. They were nonetheless a dependent and sectional elite. Commerce was almost entirely controlled by the Chinese, and public administration remained exclusively in the hands of Christian Filipinos.
Dean Jorge Bocobo offers up dramatic readings from the book in his blog, Philippine Commentary, if you want more. Suffice it to say that Bocobo relishes pointing out a point raised by McKenna, which is that the “Moro” identity was itself a legacy of the American era. Blogger reason is the reason points to the column today of Noralyn Mustafa, who points out the more authentic identity of Muslims in the Philippines is whether one is Maguindanao, or Tausug, etc.:
Then I tried the same survey with the term “Moro.” Some were visibly amused, some asked what it meant, some said that they heard the word in “Tagalog” movies, especially when a “juramentado,” properly swinging a kris dripping with blood, was featured.
When the Moro National Liberation Front (of which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is supposedly a “splinter group”) concocted the term “bangsamoro,” ostensibly to unite the different ethnic tribes that were members of the MNLF, as well as the population of Mindanao and Sulu, I thought it wise to first ask my mother, through force of habit actually….
…Would she have agreed to being called “bangsamoro”?
I don’t think so. Although she had lived in Jolo from her 17th birthday up to the day she passed away in October 1996, she insisted she was a “Zamboangueña.” She was born and raised in what is now Zamboanga City, in the ancestral home in Magay, the only “Muslim” house in a Christian neighborhood referred to as the “brick house” because of its brick tile roof.
She went to school in what was formerly known as the “Moro Settlement School,” later named St. Albans School, managed by the Episcopalian (Anglican) church, affiliated with the Brent School system, where she was a member of the tennis and basketball teams, and was placed in the soprano section of the school and church choir.
Although she worked as a teacher in Sulu until she retired, it was a must for her to go “home” to Zamboanga whenever possible, and years of speaking Bahasa Sug never diminished the fluency of her Chabacano (it is spelled with a “b” in the Spanish dictionary).
Now, would she have agreed to having some barangays in Zamboanga City included in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity? I certainly don’t think so.
The Spanish authorities requested my grandfather to be the wazir of Sultan Haroun Al-Rashid of the Palawan royalty, probably to make him more acceptable to the Tausugs, in order to settle a bitter rivalry in succession between the more popular Datu Amirul Muhminin (who would be proclaimed Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, the last sultan of Sulu) and his brother.
In Palawan is a town called Batarasa. It is named after a sultan of Sulu.
Would I agree to having Palawan included in the BJE?
I don’t think so. It is Tausug ancestral domain. And I am a Tausug.
Let me be clear about my interpretation of events (which I do not claim to be the definitive one by any means; this is only by way of explaining my approach to the problem).
I think it’s clear that what separated the Sultanate of Sulu (the only one of the major Muslim kingdoms to survive into the modern era) from the rest of what we today consider the Philippines, is that until the twilight of Spanish colonization, it managed to preserve at least nominal sovereignty over its territory. This is supported by maps from the era. It is supported, further, by President Aguinaldo recognizing that sovereignty by inviting the Sultan of Sulu to incorporate his realm into that of the infant Philippine Republic, an invitation that was declined even as the Visayan Federal State accepted a similar invitation from Aguinaldo.
Whether Spain, in turn, up to that point having established a protectorate over the Sultanate of Sulu, handed over the sultanate with the rest of its Philippine territories is actually irrelevant. American sovereignty was extended over the Sultanate of Sulu through a combination of conquest and attraction, and made binding by means of treaties. The Americans, in turn, oscillated between separating Mindanao from the Philippines or keeping it part of the Philippines. This, in turn, led Christian politicians to cultivate some traditional Muslim leaders who then signed on to the concept of Filipino nationhood.
In return for political privileges and the assertion of their status, leaders like the Sultan Sa Ramain became fixtures in the corridors of power: in the first national senatorial elections, in 1941, the Sultan was elected senator (the parceling out of seats in the Nacionalista Party slate, at a time that the country was basically under the one-party system, points to how party elders were very conscious and particular about making sure every constituency was kept happy).
but at the same time the political leadership set about, quite consciously, to keep Mindanao by settling it and thus preventing other nations from claiming it (this was a period of Japanese settlement in Davao, after all) on one hand, while strengthening the powers and authority of the government by reducing, in turn, the powers and prestige of the traditional Moro leadership.
This article, Kris v. Cross, from Time Magazine’s June 29, 1936 issue points to an opportunity that presented itself to the Philippine government:
Nine days prior, from Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago, His Highness Padukka Mahasari Manaluna Hadji Mohammad Jamalul Kiram II, Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo, Judge of Agama, lineal descendant of the Prophet, had ascended to enjoy the limitless quantities of gold, jewels, silks, dates, rice, spitted lamb and beautiful women which await the Faithful in the Mohammedan Paradise. The Sultan, who for some years was the only sovereign reigning under the U. S. flag, lived on the tribute of his 500,000 Moro subjects, plus his pension from the Philippine Government, plus his land rent from British North Borneo Co. With this wealth the Sultan kept a primitive court where he enjoyed the favors of scores of wives in his youth, several in his old age, although he begot no offspring. Three nieces, however, he adopted as his daughters. No sooner had he died than one of them, Princess Dayang Dayang,* began to quarrel with Hadji Butu, the late Sultan’s grand vizier, over who was to succeed Kiram II. Dayang Dayang won the first round. Since the Sultan’s corpse was rapidly putrefying and could not be buried until a new ruler had been chosen, she secured the appointment of her husband Datu Umbra as Sultan pro tern. Meantime, datus (princes) of the Sulu islands had been advised by Grand Vizier Hadji Butu, ablest and best educated of the Moro patriarchs, to enthrone Datu Rajamuda, only surviving brother of the late Sultan.
On the same day that the National Assembly met in Manila the datus assembled at Jolo, determined to make Rajamuda Sultan. Again the wilful Princess got the best of Hadji Butu. She informed the visiting princes that according to tradition a Sultan of Sulu could not be chosen except by unanimous vote. Therefore they must wait until every datu from the farthest Moro island had arrived. The followers of Rajamuda called her by the names of she-animals. They declared she planned to make herself Sultana or—almost as unforgivable an insult to a warrior race—get the job for her husband, Datu Umbra, or her father-in-law. Datu Amil-bangsa. The princes grumbled, but the proclamation of Rajamuda’s accession was withheld and the throne continued last week to tremble in the balance.
To this day, the heirs of the last Sultan have been unable to unite; one factor may be that the Philippine government in 1936, the year of the last acknowledged Sultan’s death, abolished the state subsidy to the sultanate and refused to recognize a successor.
In the same year that the Sultanate of Sulu passed into history, the National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Act 141, amending and compiling the laws on lands in the public domain.
Both actions -the refusal to intervene in the succession crisis among the last Sultan of Sulu’s heirs, and passing a law that firmly placed the authority of the Philippine government in the line of legal succession to American and Spanish authority, recognized as paramount by Muslim rulers in the past- was a strategy that would have been familiar to state-builders like Mustapha Kemal Ataturk or the ruling Congress Party of India. It was a policy encapsulated by Manuel Roxas in 1922:
Said the Speaker of the House, Manuel Roxas: ” We have encroached upon the rights of the Governor General because in that guise liberties are won.”
He might as well have said that encroaching upon the traditionally-asserted rights of former monarchs is also how nation-states are built.
While the Bangsamoro people have historical rights to their Ancestral Domain and land, the Christians in the provinces, municipalities and barangays that are proposed to be included in BJE have earned rights – property right to their lands and the right to belong to the political jurisdiction of their choice. This conflict of historical and earned rights is at the root of the storm of protest in North Cotabato and the cities of Zamboanga and Iligan.
The Christians have earned rights to their lands under homestead laws, through government settlement programs, or by purchase. To their credit the MILF leaders have given the assurance that they will respect lawful ownership of lands by the Christians.
Yet, the “except-clause” in Consensus 3 on “Concept and Principles” – “except when … other forms of possible usurpation or displacement for force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government project or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals, corporate entities or institutions” – is not reassuring and a source of anxiety and fear for many. And they are determined to die for their lands.
Political right is as sensitive as property right. By their own choice, people live together in a barangay, municipality and province where, led by their elected leaders, they labor to live in peace and contentment. The present protests are expression of resentment and anger for what they believe as undue interference in their political right.
Their leaders are saying this: In the ARMM plebiscites of 1989 and 2001, we voted to stay out. Why will we be included in BJE to be asked of our option again in another plebiscite in 2009? Their message – why trifle with our political right? – is clear.
To Illustrate
Why are they protesting? Only barangays and whole municipalities with predominant Muslim population are being asked to join BJE. Most of the protesters are not included.
Correct. But they contend that, first, many of the areas included are Christian-dominated; and, second, the stability and territorial integrity of their province or municipality will be adversely affected – hence, violating their right to remain stable, intact and progressive.
To illustrate, here is what will happen to North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte and Iligan City. The conflict of political rights is clear.
Cotabato: 18 municipalities. Two whole municipalities, Pikit and Kabacan, will be included in the JBE. Four others will be badly dismembered – Banisilan will lose 18 of its 20 barangays; Carmen, 17 of 28; Matalam, 12 of 34; and Pigcawayan, 20 of 44.
Except for Mlang and President Roxas that will lose three and one barangays respectively, four others will lose significantly – Alamada, six out of 17; Aleosan, 7 out of 19; Midsayap, 19 of 57; and Tulunan, 7 of 29. Only Antipas, Arakan, Libungan, Magpet and Makilala will remain intact.
This is what will happen in 2009. In 2034, or thereabout, the province stands to lose to BJE all its municipalities except Antipas, Kidapawan, Magpet and Tulunan with 22 barangays. The storm of protest in Cotabato is being condemned. Should it be?
Sultan Kudarat: 12 municipalities. All of its 10 municipalities will be included in BJE, leaving only Isulan, its capital, minus three of its 17 barangays and Tacurong City. In 2034, Isulan will be completely absorbed in BJE, leaving only Tacurong City.
While the province has a population of about 20 percent Muslim, there is no protest from there. It has a Muslim governor and one of its two congressional representatives is a Muslim.
Lanao del Norte: 22 municipalities. Six municipalities – Baloi,Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangcal – that voted YES in the 2001 ARMM plebiscite are considered part of the core area of BJE and
they will no longer take part in the plebiscite in August 2009.
The whole of six other municipalities will be included and they will take part in the plebiscite. Of the 10 other municipalities left, Kauswagan with 13 barangays will lose 12; Linamon and Magsaysay will lose all their barangays. That leaves the province with Baroy, Kapatagan and Lala intact and Bacolod, Kolambogan, Maigo and Tubod slightly affected. In 2034, Bacolod will be completely absorbed. The province will only have six municipalities.
The province has a population of 35 percent Muslim. But with a Muslim governor and one of its two congressional representatives a Muslim, there is no protest there.
Iligan City: 44 barangays. Only eight of its 44 barangays will be included in BJE. But these are the largest with a combined area of 82 percent of that of the entire city. Besides, they are the source of the city’s agricultural products. That no other barangays will be taken in 2034 is obviously not consoling to the city residents and leaders.
Looking at the above, how will the three provinces and Iligan City survive? In 2009, Tacurong City and Isulan may as well be annexed to South Cotabato, thereby abolishing Sultan Kudarat, and Lanao del Norte be abolished with its remaining municipalities given the option to be included in BJE or realigned to Misamis Oriental.
Recapitulation
MOA-AD is founded on sound concepts and principles. But as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, so concepts and principles are only as good as their actualization. The storm of protests that met the publication of the agreement shows the need to reexamine its contents in order to reconcile conflicts and to remove obstacles blocking the peace process.
But let me return to the unraveling of the partnership between the leadership of Christian and Moro Filipinos, and what may be the event that blew the lid off the festering contradictions of that partnership.
The elections of 1949 -immortalized by the line “first they voted in Lanao, pati na aswang pa daw!” in the Mambo Magsaysay- revealed the patchwork nature of this alliance between traditional leaders. As the rest of the Philippines became more modern, the shared values of the Muslim and Christian political old guard -to maintain the appearance of democracy while winking at each other as to how their authority was derived through undemocratic means- became increasingly untenable.
On a national scale this led to the prewar politicians suffering an electorate debacle in 1953, with a brief restoration in 1957 but with the momentum for the younger generation restored with Macapagal’s victory in 1961. It took a little longer for Muslims and the delay meant that younger Muslim leaders not from the traditional aristocracy, but also influenced by Western thinking and the demise of colonialism, could look to secular Arab nationalism, with Gamel Abdal Nasser as their inspiration.
The decline in the influence, prestige, and legitimacy of the old Muslim royalty (McKenna suggests their claims to old pedigrees was itself something of a fraud) led to the rise of secularist intellectuals like Nur Misuari, and new warlords like the Dimaporos and Sinsuats of the modern era. The story of the decline of the old, and the secular, nationalist, aspirations of the new Muslim leaders -who created in the 1970s for Muslims what Rizal had created for Christians in the 1870s, the concept of nationhood (”Filipino” and “Bangsamoro” respectively) would then collide with what has come to subvert the nationalist-secular order in places like Egypt: Islamic fundamentalism, one of the ideological divides between the MNLF and the MILF.
But the reality is whether one proposes and another person contests, an interpretation of history, everyone has to acknowledge that what matters is what the majority subscribes to. I’ve pointed to the dominant narrative in Some readings on Mindanao, and that dominant narrative does not view the commitments of the traditional Muslim leadership as legitimate, and therefore, whatever partnership existed between them has been retroactively declared null and void by today’s Muslim leaders.
This Wikipedia map showing the historical extent of Moro territory and the present-day Moro provinces (in yellow), and the present-day Muslim areas in red, contradicts the maps I showed in previous entries:
But in the end, it does not matter if the claimed areas are based on fact or fable. First of all, because poorly-educated Christian Filipinos, leaders and followers alike, can’t argue othrwise; and second, even if they could, the leadership of the Moros believe it to be so, and will fight to make it so again.
The Bangsa Moro Blog is not coy at all as to the ultimate territorial aspirations of at least some Muslims in Mindanao:
But let me point you, finally, to Philippine Politics 04, who points out, in turn, that even as the MILF may be courting Uncle Sam, some of the Christian politicians talking so bravely about the integrity of the Republic, had planned to secede from the Republic themselves.
I have been working on 20 Speeches That Moved a Nation Volume IIfor some years now, and one of the speeches I decided to include was this one, taken from the Constitutional Convention records. It was delivered by Alaoya Alonto, the Sultan Sa Ramain, convention delegate representing Lanao. By way of putting the speech in its historical context, here is an extract froma paper by Rizal G. Buendia:
In the 1934 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1935 PhilippineConstitution (used as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth and 1946 Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP]), several elected Muslim Constitutional delegates, led by Alauya Alonto, called upon their fellow delegates not only to cease calling Muslims Moros but also to accept Muslims as part of the Filipino nation.
This turn of events is a classic case of shifting self-definition, attaching new value and meaning to one’s identity in the prospect of advancing its political interestsand exigencies of power within the parameters of a newfound state. This is a clear case wherein ethnic identity is simply not fixed but malleable and shaped by one’s interest in preserving power and access to resources as expounded by instrumentalists Brass and Cohen.
What deepened in almost two decades from the 1950s was the ethnic self-recognition of the masses as Filipino-Muslims (foremost as a Filipino and second, as a Muslim). The legitimacy of the Philippine state to govern the Muslim areas of thecountry was neither questioned nor challenged by any of the Muslim elite. The emergence of new intellectuals and counter-elite among the Muslims and the political events that transpired in the late 1960s until the early 1970s triggered the re-invention of Muslim identity. The massacre of about 28 Muslim military trainees (called ‘Jabidah commandos’) on Corregidor Island in March 1968 rekindled the quest of Muslims for independence, almost 50 years after it was first clamored for inthe 1920s.
