The MOA is dead! Long live the MOA!

By Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Contributor

THE initialed but unsigned final draft of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), the subject of much current controversy at the national level and of fighting in Central Mindanao, has been “set aside for all intents and purposes” by the Philippine government, at least by its Executive Department (we have to be clear these days which of the three departments is actually acting). The matter is still pending in the Supreme Court but the Executive has announced:“No matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides, the government will not sign the MOA… in its present form or in any form.” In so many words, the MOA is dead. Those who were so worried about what they thought as the MOA giving away national sovereignty and territory to a new Bangsamoro state, in grave violation of the Constitution, need not worry anymore. The MOA is dead. What they should perhaps worry about now is whether the peace process with the MILF is also dead or at a dead end, where the detour taken could lead to a full-blown war.

The peace negotiations were meant to resolve the armed conflict on the Moro front through a negotiated political settlement for a just, lasting and comprehensive solution of the Bangsamoro problem. The ancestral domain aspect of that problem was lined up as the penultimate substantive agenda heading before finally working out the political solution and the legal modalities in a Comprehensive Compact. But this mutually agreed process has reached a dead end of sorts with the non-signing of the MOA, as far as the MILF is concerned. It remains to be seen whether this deadlock can be unlocked. The logic of the whole process would seem to dictate that, since the peace negotiations cannot proceed for the MILF, then it can be expected to consider “alternative means to achieve freedom and justice for the Bangsamoro people” (from an official statement of MILF chief peace negotiator Mohagher Iqbal). These other options include a return to armed struggle which the Moro liberation fronts had waged in the first place to achieve political objectives. And when this rebellion is met by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in order to suppress it, then you have an armed conflict. This could go back in some ways to the situation during the early years of martial law before the 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

The Executive Department had announced that it will not sign the MOA due to “changed circumstances” like the ongoing controversy at the national level and the precarious ground situation in Central Mindanao, in effect saying that the MOA issue had become more political than legal. Stated otherwise, the MOA has become politically untenable to sign as far as the government’s own Christian majority constituency is concerned. The non-signing the MOA was calculated to give the Executive some space to engage in various political efforts to defuse the political situation as well as address the ground situation. As for the peace process, the Peace Adviser and the GRP Peace Panel Chairperson have mulled continuing this through “further negotiations” that already “move towards a Comprehensive Compact,” of course coupled with “consultation with various stakeholders” — the major lesson from the aborted MOA experience.

But there are strong indications that the MILF will not entertain any GRP proposal for “further negotiations” even towards a final peace agreement with the Arroyo administration after its firmed-up decision not to sign the MOA. For them, never mind if there is another indefinite impasse, they will just wait for the next President, “if we get there.” In the meantime, they will consider other options. Let me try to share my understanding of this likely MILF view of rejecting “further negotiations” with the Arroyo administration. They take what happened to the MOA (including but not just the Executive’s decision of non-signing) as the GRP having negotiated in bad faith, and thus the basic trust built by years of peace talks has been seriously eroded. The bottom line is that the Arroyo administration cannot deliver after all. This whole experience hurts for them but at least they now know the real score and where they stand vis-à-vis the whole Philippine side — Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, Local Governments, Business Sector, Media, General Public, etc. all ganged up on the MOA. The widespread and loud rejection of the MOA by the whole Philippine side is like a rejection of the Moros and their aspirations for recognition of their identity, way of life and longing for self-rule. The truth hurts but it sets us free.

The MOA is now an already closed chapter as far as the MILF is concerned, even as it remains an important document for them. The MOA had at least placed Moro aspirations on the national agenda, discourse and consciousness. They say that it has even become a rallying point for Moro unity. So, there is already with them some sense of moral ascendancy or even victory with the MOA issue. They cannot for their own self-respect go into “further negotiations” which would not be on the basis of a signed MOA. This was already the product of difficult but successful negotiations up to its final draft with the “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” (that’s what the MOA says, not just “Executive Department”) for more than three years starting 2005. They cannot defend doing this (“further negotiations” without first signing the MOA) to their own forces and constituency. They themselves do not see the viability of “further negotiations” for a final peace agreement which may end up just like the MOA. To use an Islamic expression, it would be like “getting bitten by a snake twice in the same pit.”

Still, the MOA should be seen an important document, and not just for the MILF and the Bangsamoro people. It is also an important document for the peace process, for history, for eventual understanding between two peoples, and no less for the Filipino people in addressing their various nation-building problems, not just the Bangsamoro problem. Notwithstanding the admittedly unfamiliar and difficult language and concepts in the MOA, Cotabato Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI, says it “is a remarkable document. It is a very serious attempt to balance national sovereignty and Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination and freedom. For this reason, I believe that the MOA can bring lasting peace…. The balancing act… may be seen in the concepts on governance, concretized in such terms as ‘associative relationships,’ ‘shared authority,’ the idea of ‘central government,’ and its responsibility for external defense, etc. For the GRP, the balancing continues with two fundamental democratic safety values — acts of Congress and referendum [or plebiscite].” In this sense, long live the MOA — as a landmark or watershed exercise in exploring the possibilities of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Philippine and Moro sides, after decades of armed conflict with long historical roots and complex dimensions.

The MOA shows that at least some Filipinos and Moros can compromise or find a middle ground for a proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) which would be something between the existing Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and independent statehood, the original common aspiration of the Moro liberation fronts. This aspiration is based on the historical sovereignty of the Moro sultanates which were once sovereign independent nation-states several centuries before there even was a Philippine State and Constitution. Thus, also a compromise or middle ground between a man-made Constitution with its sovereignty of the people, and a God-made Qur’an with its sovereignty of Allah. The MOA idea is for “shared sovereignty” between the Central Government and the BJE in an “associative relationship” where it is the former, not the latter, which represents the sovereign independent State.

Then, there is also a compromise or middle ground between the present ARMM territory and that of the original historical Bangsamoro homeland covering the whole of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. This was their homeland which was annexed to the Philippine Islands ceded by Spain to the United States by way of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, and then incorporated in the Republic of the Philippines granted its independence by the U.S. in 1946, in both cases without the plebiscitary consent of the Bangsamoro people. This was the same homeland in Mindanao which was 76 percent Moro in population in 1903 but which had become just 19 percent Moro by 1990 as a result of government resettlement programs which systematically brought Christian settlers from the Visayas and Luzon into Mindanao over several decades. The MILF to its credit is seeking as territory for the BJE basically those geographical areas which the Moros still actually occupy or where they are the majority per present reality on the ground, and still subject to plebiscite. In any case, this BJE territory would remain part of, not be dismembered from, the national territory.

If there is one thing that the MOA issue has opened up, aside from a deeper sense of Moro aspirations, it is the need to “think out of the box” of the Constitution. Newspaper columnist and Sociology Prof. Randy David pointed out, as early as 1999 to 2000, the need for “the readiness on the part of government to allow a wide latitude for institutional experimentation in the region, instead of the constant invocation of constitutional limits as a warning against insolent initiatives.” He also wrote of a certain “constitutional pragmatism” which is necessary to overcome “constitutional obstacles that that have needlessly prevented the exploration of more creative approaches to the Mindanao problem.” He is reminded of John Dewey’s insight: “The belief in political fixity, of the sanctity of some form of state consecrated by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradition, is one of the stumbling blocks in the way of orderly and directed change; it is an invitation to revolt and revolution.”

There is, of course, so much more subject matter involved in the MOA. There is still much to learn in further studying and discussing the concepts found therein as well as the issues which have emerged in the controversy about it. After an adequate period of dispassionate, informed and intelligent discussion of these concepts and issues by all concerned — “after some sanity is restored,” says Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado, Jr., OMI — the time should come when the parties can viably continue their peace negotiations, presumably from where they left off. Much depends on how an expected interregnum or hiatus or what the MILF’s Iqbal calls “purgatory” is handled by both sides in the coming weeks and months.

Given that prospect of no “further negotiations” as well as the danger of military options on both sides, the best bets for the remaining period (one year and ten months) of the Arroyo administration are to somehow maintain the ceasefire, enhance rehabilitation and development work and projects, and pursue the three-part imperatives suggested by Archbishop Quevedo. The premise for the first two “bets” is that the prior agreements on the security and rehabilitation aspects should not to be derogated or set aside. The Quevedo imperatives refer to: “consultation and dialogue, information and education, and building of a constituency supportive of the general goals and specific objectives as well as the processes and contents of peace negotiations.”

In these various ways, the ground is laid for a return to the ancestral domain aspect and other substantive matters of peace negotiation when this become more viable, even if in the next administration already. The time for the MOA will come but then in another form.

Share This